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The inauguration of Filipe Nyusi as Mozambique’s president represents a generational 
shift, as he is the first candidate to 
be elected without having fought 
in the war for independence. This 
paper asks the following question: 
to what extent are there continuities 
and discontinuities in the nationalist 
narrative of building a democratic and 
peaceful state, especially after the end 
of the civil conflict? We argue that the 
post-conflict political and economic 
liberalisation had a ‘placebo effect’ 
on pluralism and prospects for shared 
economic opportunities. 
Although RENAMO and the 
Mozambique Democratic Movement 
(MDM) have challenged FRELIMO’s 
electoral dominance, strengthening 
nascent democratic institutions, 
FRELIMO has a monopoly of power 
and force in the Mozambican state, 
shaping its political economy outlook 
and choices. We adopt Frantz Fanon’s 
bold word of caution to emerging 
nationalists against the ‘Pitfalls of 
National Consciousness’ and suggest 
that Mozambique’s post-conflict 
political economy of development 
should move beyond critical 
studies rooted in decolonisation to 
decoloniality.
From Decolonisation to 
Decoloniality: Mozambique in Africa 
In 1975, FRELIMO won the war 
for independence from Portuguese 
colonial rule. The new Mozambican 
government embraced Scientific 
Socialism under one-party rule led by 
the charismatic Samora Machel. In 
1977, civil conflict – rooted in power 
grievances and geopolitical rivalries of 
the Cold War era – ensued between 
FRELIMO and RENAMO. The collapse 
of socialist states in the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe, a weakened 
economy and shifting alliances led 
to FRELIMO’s abandonment of its 
Marxist-Leninist ideology, capitulating 
to neoliberal recommendations 
proffered by Western powers and 
international financial institutions 
(IFI). Under President Chissano in the 
late 1980s, the FRELIMO government 
approved an Economic Rehabilitation 
Programme spearheaded by the World 
Bank and the International Monetary 
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Fund (IMF), privatising 1200 state 
companies. 
After 16 years of conflict, the 
FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação 
de Moçambique) government and 
RENAMO (Resistência Nacional 
Moçambicana), the former  rebel 
group funded and sustained by the 
apartheid regime, turned political 
party and largest national opposition, 
signed Mozambique’s General Peace 
Agreement (GPA) in 1992. The ceasefire 
ushered in a new era of political and 
economic liberalisation coinciding with 
the Third Wave of democratisation in 
Africa. Mozambique has been hailed by 
international financial institutions and 
pertinent multilateral organisations as 
a “success story” of post-conflict peace 
andstability and economic recovery. In 
1997, Mozambique received the Africa 
Peace Award in recognition for its 
efforts towards national reconciliation, 
peace and stability while upholding 
fundamental human rights and 
promoting good governance. 
In spite of this accolade progress is 
offset by regression in other areas. A 
booming mineral sector and massive 
inflows of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) has spurred rapid economic 
growth at an average annual rate of 7.1 
per cent1, one of the world’s highest. In 
this political and economic order rent-
seeking practices and the manipulation 
of institutions to benefit the elite 
are synonymous with Mozambique 
depiction as a ‘successful’ post-conflict 
reconstruction narrative. According 
to the Human Development Index, 
Mozambique ranks as one of the 
poorest countries in the world and 
continues to be plagued by diseases 
like malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/
AIDS, rising inequality, hunger and 
inadequate educational resources in 
both urban and rural areas.2 Further, 
politico-military tensions between 
the government and the opposition 
RENAMO have taken a toll on the 
civilian population in the country’s 
central and northern regions. Youth 
unemployment is rising as the economy 
focuses on fiscal and monetary policies 
like inflation targeting and exchange 
rate stability to the neglect of job 
creation.3  
As Fanon suggested, “National 
consciousness, instead of being the 
all-embracing crystallization of the 
innermost hopes of the whole people, 
instead of being the immediate and 
most obvious result of the mobilisation 
of the people, will be in any case only 
an empty shell, a crude and fragile 
travesty of what it might have been.” 
Fanon warned against the rise of a 
ruling elite that would use force and 
coercion to manipulate political and 
economic institutions to the detriment 
of citizens.
Mozambique and other African 
countries must deal with the 
continent’s political, economic and 
social condition rooted in decoloniality. 
Decoloniality goes beyond the precepts 
of decolonial “thinking and doing”4. 
It questions or problematises the 
histories of power, underlying the logic 
of Western civilisation. Decoloniality 
is a response to the relation of direct 
political, social and cultural domination 
established by Europeans.5 The 
concept refers to analytic approaches 
– and socioeconomic and political 
practices – opposed to the pillars 
of Western civilisation: coloniality 
and modernity. Thus, it is both a 
political and epistemic project.6 In its 
more practical applications – such as 
movements for indigenous autonomy, 
like the Zapatista uprising for self-
government – decoloniality entails a 
“programmatic”7 for de-linking from 
contemporary legacies of coloniality, 
a response to needs unmet by modern 
governments8 or, most broadly, a 
search for a “new humanity”9, based 
on “social liberation from all power 
organised as inequality, discrimination, 
exploitation and domination”.10
Deceptive Political and Economic 
Liberalisation
Political liberalisation in Africa 
and Mozambique in the 1990s 
was primarily characterised by an 
exponential emergence of democratic 
institutions – free press, opposition 
parties, independent unions and 
civic organisations11 – in line with the 
Western discourse of human rights 
and democracy. Mozambique’s 
1990 Constitution and the 1992 GPA 
envisioned a pluralist democracy 
characterised by a commitment to 
multiparty elections, press freedom 
and protection for civil society 
organisations. Mozambique has 
held five highly-contested elections, 
which have culminated in FRELIMO’s 
dominance of the executive and 
legislative branches, while curtailing 
powers of the judiciary. The 15 
October results showed that Nyusi, the 
candidate of the ruling FRELIMO Party, 
won 2,803,536 votes (57 per cent). 
His nearest rival, Afonso Dhakama, 
leader of the former rebel movement 
RENAMO, was a million votes behind. 
Dhlakama won 1,800,448 votes (36.6 
per cent). The third candidate, Daviz 
Simango, mayor of Beira, and leader 
of the Mozambique Democratic 
Movement (MDM), won 314,759 
votes (6.4 per cent)12. The RENAMO 
leader has threatened to form a 
parallel government as accusations of 
malpractice and fraud were instigated 
against the incumbent party FRELIMO. 
Nyusi inherits institutional inertia 
as well as a political and economic 
gridlock that prevents the radical 
provision of a new social structure that 
would undo the existing inequalities 
of opportunity and address poverty. 
The ruling party has strengthened its 
hold on not only the state, but also 
society and the market, through a 
system of integration between the state 
apparatus and the party, as well as the 
rise of a nomenclatura with interests in 
politics as well as business.13 
We have argued elsewhere 
that Mozambique’s post-conflict 
democracy is a “Managed Democracy”, 
as opposed to an inclusive African 
democracy rooted in the fight 
against colonialism14. The public 
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sector is deeply politicised and, since 
independence, the president of the 
republic and head of government has 
always simultaneously been the party 
president. FRELIMO’s dominance in 
parliament and monopoly over the 
judicial system keep the executive 
strong and nearly exempt from public 
scrutiny. FRELIMO’s unchallenged 
position has created an elite-based 
system, which deviates fundamentally 
from its revolutionary ideology and 
allows for abuses of power for private 
business interests. This has led to 
an increasingly disgruntled citizenry 
and mounting tensions between the 
FRELIMO government and RENAMO 
armed forces.
Owing to the heavy politicisation 
of the public sector, civil servants have 
been coerced to join the ruling party 
and pledge allegiance to its leadership 
to secure top level positions in the 
public service.15 Public servants who 
are suspected of being allied to an 
opposition party like RENAMO or 
MDM face limited prospects for growth 
in the public sector. Criticism of the 
ruling party can lead to suspension 
from the party and loss of public office, 
as exemplified by the suspension of 
Antonio Frangoulis, the former head 
of the Criminal Investigation Police, 
from the party due to his criticism of 
FRELIMO’s governance in a televised 
debate.16 
Currently, civil society institutions, 
such as the press and unions, are private 
and independent in name but largely 
operate in tandem with the ruling party. 
The main media outlets, television and 
newspapers, are controlled by the state. 
Thus, they do not challenge FRELIMO 
but rather highlight its accomplishments, 
projecting the image of a party engaged 
in eradicating absolute poverty, boosting 
self-esteem and fighting corruption. 
Despite an increase in pundits from 
academia and local media offering 
critical analyses of the state, most 
analysts in the public domain remain 
hesitant to challenge the FRELIMO 
government and its leadership. 
Voices in civil society are being shut 
out, and space for dissent is shrinking. 
Prominent citizens like hip-hop artist 
Azagaia and economist Carlos Nunes 
Castel-Branco were interrogated by 
the Attorney-General for criticising 
the former president Guebuza and 
his government. Civil society is under-
funded, structurally weak and, in many 
cases, linked to FRELIMO.17 Despite 
shortcomings, some civil society 
members have organised notable 
protests against food and transport 
price hikes, politico-military tensions, 
violence in the country and mining-
induced resettlements. Many of these 
events have culminated in brutal 
responses from state police forces. The 
FRELIMO government remains largely 
uncontested, and political freedom 
has failed to translate into inclusive 
democratic institutions.
The move towards economic 
liberalisation entailed the privatisation 
of state-owned enterprises. This led 
to the development of an almost 
indivisible tripartite alliance comprising 
the state, the party and business – a 
marriage between business and politics. 
Mozambique’s formerly socialist 
political elite  became its capitalist elite, 
as state-owned enterprises were either 
passed on to FRELIMO ex-combatants 
and militants or acquired by party 
officials at very low prices using 
inexpensive loans from donors eager 
to promote privatisation.18 According 
to Hanlon: 
…the formal transition to multi-
party democracy in 1994 was not 
accompanied by other mechanisms 
normal in democracies. There were 
no conflict of interest regulation, 
no asset reporting and other 
transparency requirements, and 
no reforms to the justice system. 
Thus the elite came to understand 
that “democracy” and “capitalism” 
meant that they were allowed to 
use their privileged positions to 
accumulate wealth unobserved.19
The transition allowed a capitalist 
elite to become deeply rooted in 
FRELIMO party structures. Former 
president Guebuza, who amassed 
significant wealth in the 1990s, provides 
one conspicuous example. Since coming 
to power in 2005, Guebuza cemented 
his influence in party structures and 
maintained an iron grip on power. 
Already amongst the richest people 
in Mozambique prior to his election, 
Guebuza consolidated business interests 
in telecommunications, transport, 
fishing, mining, tourism, publishing, 
consultancy, construction and banking, 
and extended these interests to family 
members and allies.20 Under the 1990 
Constitution, Guebuza could not run for 
the presidency in the national elections 
of 2014. Nonetheless, he has been 
re-elected party president. Strategically, 
Guebuza successfully lobbied for 
the election of one of his loyalists, 
ex-Defence Minister Filipe Nyussi, to 
the presidency.21 
Conflict of interests in the coal 
mining industry is another clear 
example of the marriage between 
business and politics. Many top level 
public officials involved in regulating 
the companies in Mozambique’s 
booming coal mining industry are also 
private executives within the same 
enterprises.22 For example, Aboobacar 
Changa, a tax judge serving on a 
tribunal commissioned to audit state 
corporations is the director of one of 
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the companies being audited by the 
government and a business partner 
of other public officials who are also 
subject to his legal review.23 The 
confidentiality of mining contracts 
between the government and the 
mining companies operating in 
Mozambique, coupled with poor 
reporting of revenues and amounts 
subject to taxation entering state 
coffers, raises questions with regard 
to transparency, accountability 
and the management of natural 
resource funds.24 Considering the 
aforementioned lack of transparency 
and the involvement of state officials 
in private mining enterprises, analysts 
have pointed out the potential for 
diversion of public funds from state 
coffers in the extractive industries.25 
Repercussions for Peace and 
Stability
The politico-military tensions 
deeply affecting the security of 
civilians in the central and northern 
regions of Mozambique epitomise the 
weaknesses of the post-GPA political 
and economic liberalisation process. 
The system has produced disparities, 
making the state’s position a source of 
insecurity. In October 2013, RENAMO 
leader Afonso Dhlakhama moved 
to the Gorongosa bush in southern 
Mozambique to train and arm soldiers. 
The mobilisation of RENAMO forces 
expresses the opposition party’s 
discontent and political grievances, 
which include political marginalisation 
from national institutions as well 
as the overall economic exclusion 
felt through swelling inequalities 
at the national level. In response, 
FRELIMO-led government forces 
stormed Dhlakama’s base, resulting in 
RENAMO’s nullification of the GPA 
and announced return to violence. 
RENAMO attacks in central and 
northern Mozambique have taken the 
lives of innocent civilians and have 
forced the displacement of significant 
amounts of the population from the 
Sofala and Tete provinces to other 
regions. By July 2014, there had 
been over 60 rounds of negotiations 
between the FRELIMO government 
and RENAMO concluding with a 
new peace proviso in August 2014. 
Subsequent to the 2014 elections 
RENAMO resorted to the politics 
of retribution proposing to divide 
the country into two regions, north 
and south, leaving the mineral-rich 
provinces in the north to RENAMO and 
the southern provinces to FRELIMO. 
Conclusion
Mozambique’s post-conflict 
transition raises  two important issues. 
Firstly the post-conflict state has failed 
to transform the country towards a 
more humane politics. This is a result 
of the manipulation of political and 
economic institutions, which have 
not been adequately addressed by 
decolonisation. Analysts who fail to 
recognise the connection between 
the politics of decoloniality and 
the production of knowledge, i.e., 
between programmatics and analytics, 
are likely to reflect “an underlying 
acceptance of capitalist modernity, 
liberal democracy, and individualism”26 
– values which decoloniality seeks 
to challenge. New discourses of 
Mozambique’s post-conflict political 
economy of development should 
be rooted in decoloniality, which 
prioritises citizenship in development 
practice. 
Secondly FRELIMO’s policies and 
tactics have become anti-democratic, 
and the transition to ‘democracy’ has 
resulted in higher levels of inequality. 
FRELIMO under the leadership of 
Nyusi will continue to solidify political 
institutions that entrench poverty and 
inequality in Mozambique. While 
charismatic leaders like Samora Machel 
instilled a progressive vision for a new 
society, poverty, inequality and social 
exclusion have become the order of 
the day. When the wealth of a nation is 
controlled by an elite few, opportunity 
and ingenuity are curtailed. Citizens 
are excluded as political and economic 
institutions supported by FRELIMO 
have become illusive. An examination 
of post-conflict Mozambique reveals 
that the FRELIMO government under 
the leadership of Nyusi will continue 
to entrench extractive political and 
economic institutions, using coercive 
political tactics and successive party 
structures, to the detriment of citizens. ■
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